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Abstract 23 
Based on optimal foraging theory, we propose a metric that allows evaluating the goodness of 24 
goal systems, i.e., systems comprising multiple goals with facilitative and conflicting 25 
interrelations. This optimal foraging theory takes into account expectancy and value, as well as 26 
opportunity costs, of foraging. Applying this approach to goal systems provides a single index of 27 
goodness of a goal system for goal striving. Three quasi-experimental studies (N = 277, N = 145, 28 
and N = 210) provide evidence for the usefulness of this approach for goal systems comprising 29 
between three to 10 goals. Results indicate that persons with a more optimized goal-system are 30 
more conscientious and open to new experience, are more likely to represent their goals in terms 31 
of means (i.e., adopt a process focus), and are more satisfied and engaged with their goals. 32 
Persons with a suboptimal goal system tend to switch their goals more often and thereby 33 
optimize their goal system. We discuss limitations as well as possible future directions of this 34 
approach. 35 
 Keywords: Disengagement; goal systems; multiple goals; optimal foraging. 36 
 37 
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Some Evidence for an Optimal Foraging Theory Perspective on Goal Conflict and Goal 40 
Facilitation 41 
 Goals, defined as “desired states that people seek to obtain, maintain or avoid” (Emmons, 42 
1996, p. 314), can be considered as “building blocks of personality and development in 43 
adulthood” (Freund & Riediger, 2006, p. 353) that provide direction and meaning to a person‘s 44 
life (Freund, 2007; Klinger, 1977; Little, 1989). Goals guide attention and behavior (e.g., Bargh 45 
& Ferguson, 2000) and represent a standard for evaluating performance (e.g., Bandura, 1989), 46 
which in turn affects subjective well-being (e.g., Brunstein, 1993). Given the importance of goals 47 
for adaptation and development, it is not surprising that there are numerous theories that attempt 48 
to explain and understand the processes of goal setting (e.g., Austin & Bobko, 1985; Locke & 49 
Latham, 1990), goal striving (e.g., Freund & Baltes, 2002; Gollwitzer & Brandstätter, 1997) and 50 
goal adjustment (e.g., Brandtstädter & Rothermund, 2002; Wrosch, Scheier, Carver, & Schulz, 51 
2003). Most of these theories focus on single, isolated goals and their characteristics, while 52 
others explicitly take into account that goals are organized in goal systems (e.g., Kruglanski et 53 
al., 2002). The latter approaches recognize that, in everyday life, most people strive for multiple 54 
goals that are often interconnected (e.g., Dodge, Asher, & Parkhurst, 1989) and can have 55 
complex positive (or facilitative) and negative (or interfering) reciprocal relationships, both at 56 
the level of means and outcomes of goal striving (Riediger & Freund, 2004; Sheldon & Kasser, 57 
1995). These approaches increasingly gain scientific attention (e.g., Tomasik, 2016). 58 
 Compared to the wealth of knowledge about characteristics of single goals, only very 59 
little is known about the adaptiveness of the goal system of a person for goal pursuit and 60 
achievement. The purpose of this paper is to propose a metric that allows evaluating the 61 
goodness of goal systems comprising multiple goals. We develop our argumentation in six steps: 62 
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First, we review the central concepts and findings of expectancy-value theories for single goals 63 
in order to present one possible definition of what makes a goal a “good goal.” Second, we 64 
expand this position to multiple goals, review some literature on positive and negative intergoal 65 
relations, and again ask what makes a goal system a “good goal system.” Third, we combine the 66 
former and the latter to arrive at an expectancy-value model taking into account intergoal 67 
relations. Fourth, we derive a mathematical formalization of intergoal relations based on the 68 
theory of optimal foraging – a framework successfully applied in behavioral biology to predict 69 
how animals behave when they search for food – in order to combine the expectancy-value 70 
approach with what we know about intergoal relations. This mathematical formalization allows 71 
computing a metric for evaluating the goodness of goal systems, which we do in the fifth step 72 
using empirical data from three quasi-experimental studies. Finally, we discuss the empirical 73 
findings obtained and point to future directions towards a theory of multiple goals.  74 
On Expectancies and Values: What Makes a “Good Goal?” 75 
 What constitutes adaptive goal selection and goal setting, in particular with regard to 76 
subsequent goal achievement? Bandura (1997) argued that specific, proximal, and moderately 77 
challenging goals promote self-efficacy and are related to higher performance. Other researches 78 
have argued that specific goals that are difficult to achieve are associated with highest 79 
performance, at least as long as ability is not at its limits (Locke & Latham, 1990). However, 80 
performance is not only limited by ability. Researchers who take a developmental perspective 81 
argue that it is necessary to consider the changing opportunities and constraints for goal 82 
attainment across the lifespan (Freund & Baltes, 2002) as a blueprint against which the adaptive 83 
value of goals can be defined. Similarly, Heckhausen (1999) argued that, in order to make an 84 
optimal use of individual and social resources, people should take into account the age-sequential 85 
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opportunity structures provided by both biology and society when selecting goals. Within this 86 
lifespan theoretical framework, goals that are ambitious, but at the same time attainable relative 87 
to the biological, psychological, and social resources available to the individual, are considered 88 
as conducive to subjective well-being (Sheldon & Elliot, 1999) and successful development 89 
(Brandtstädter & Rothermund, 2002; Freund & Baltes, 2002). 90 
 Taken together, the different theoretical perspectives converge in the notion that, in 91 
adaptive goal setting, people need to balance (a) relatively high standards or aspirations with (b) 92 
relatively high attainment probability of a goal given the available resources and opportunity 93 
structures. This notion is closely related to motivational expectancy-value models (for reviews 94 
see Eccles & Wigfield, 2002; Wigfield & Eccles, 2000). Expectancy-value models assume, that 95 
behavior is best explained by the multiplicative product of attainment probability (or goal 96 
expectancy) and the valance of a goal (or goal value). People do not necessarily choose the 97 
alternative that is most attractive or most likely attainable, but the alternative that maximizes the 98 
product of expectancy and value, thereby optimizing the emotional reward after success and 99 
information about one‘s ability after failure (H. Heckhausen, Schmalt, & Schneider, 1985). In 100 
line with this theoretical framework, we define the goodness of goals as the combination of a 101 
high subjective incentive (or value) with a high goal attainment probability (or expectancy) 102 
relative to available resources and opportunities. 103 
On Intergoal Relations: What Makes a “Good Goal System?” 104 
In their everyday lives, people usually strive for multiple goals (e.g., Dodge et al., 1989), 105 
such as goals in the domains of career, relationship, family, or health and well-being (Nurmi, 106 
1992). The relationship between goals can be characterized by independence, facilitation, or 107 
interference (Argyle, Furnham, & Graham, 1981; Little, 1989). Whereas independent goals have 108 
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no relevant impact on each other, intergoal facilitation occurs when “the pursuit of one goal 109 
simultaneously increases the likelihood of success in reaching another goal” (Riediger, 2007, p. 110 
121). This might result either from instrumental relations among goals or from overlapping goal 111 
attainment strategies (Riediger, 2007; Wilensky, 1983). An example of the former is the goal of 112 
obtaining an educational degree, which is likely instrumental in the goal of finding a good job. 113 
An instance of overlapping goal attainment strategies is that joining a sports club is effective for 114 
both improving one’s fitness and getting to know new people. Intergoal interference or goal 115 
conflict occurs when “the pursuit of one goal impairs the likelihood of success in reaching the 116 
other goal” (Riediger, 2007, p. 122). Interference might result either form resource constraints, 117 
such as time or money, or from incompatible goal attainment strategies, such as wanting to lose 118 
weight and going on a gourmet vacation (e.g., Greenhaus & Beutell, 1985). Note that both 119 
facilitation and interference predominantly exist at the level of goal attainment strategies and 120 
goal-relevant resources, and relate to a much lesser degree to the compatibility or incompatibility 121 
of goal outcomes. 122 
Empirical evidence suggests that intergoal facilitation and intergoal conflict are not 123 
opposite ends of one dimension, but can be considered as two independent goal dimensions 124 
(Riediger & Freund, 2004; Riediger, Freund, & Baltes, 2005): Some aspects of a goal might 125 
facilitate some and interfere with other aspects of another goal. For example, the goal of joining 126 
a sports club might be facilitative for the goal of having a large social network as one gets to 127 
know new people. However, the time spent in the sports club is not available for socializing with 128 
old friends whom one might eventually lose. 129 
Their differential associations with other goal-related variables also support 130 
distinguishing intergoal facilitation and intergoal conflict as two independent dimensions: Goals 131 
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characterized by high facilitation are also pursued more intensively, as indicated by both self- 132 
reported goal involvement and objective behavioral measures (e.g., Riediger & Freund, 2006; 133 
Riediger et al., 2005). Intergoal facilitation, however, shows only weak, if any, associations with 134 
subjective well-being. In contrast, goal conflict is associated with lower subjective well-being, as 135 
indicated by measures of psychological distress, life satisfaction, psychosomatic complaints, as 136 
well as state and trait measures of emotional well-being (e.g., Freund, Knecht, & Wiese, 2014; 137 
Palys & Little, 1983; Pomaki, Maes, & ter Doest, 2004; Riediger & Freund, 2004). The 138 
associations of goal conflict with goal engagement, however, are weak and inconsistent.  139 
The empirical evidence on intergoal relations cited thus far suggests that a goal system 140 
comprising multiple goals can be classified as a “good goal system” if it is characterized by 141 
many and strong facilitative relations between goals, as well as few and weak interfering 142 
relations. Such a goal system is not only likely to promote goal-related variables, such as 143 
engagement and persistence, but is probably also associated with higher subjective well-being 144 
and lower psychological distress.  145 
Only little is known about the individual and contextual level predictors of “good goal 146 
systems.” However, there is some evidence that older adults experience less goal conflict (e.g., 147 
Kehr, 2003; Locke, Smith, Erez, Chah, & Schaffer, 1994) and more goal facilitation (e.g., 148 
Riediger et al., 2005; Riediger & Freund, 2006) compared to younger adults. Why this is the case 149 
is not yet fully understood (but see Riediger & Freund, 2008; Tomasik & Freund, 2015). 150 
However, having an adaptive goal system seems to be one of the developmental phenomena that 151 
exhibit a positive trajectory across adulthood (Riediger, 2007). 152 
Integrating Intergoal Relation within an Expectancy-Value Framework 153 
Up to this point, we have argued that “good goals” are characterized by high expectancy 154 
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and value, and that “good goal systems” show high intergoal facilitation and low conflict. 155 
Combining these two propositions for a single goal means that a “good goal” should not only 156 
have a high product of expectancy and value but also, at the same time, have facilitative relations 157 
to (many) other goals which, in turn, also have a high product of expectancy and value. 158 
Furthermore, a “good goal” should have few interfering relations with other goals. If at all, it 159 
should interfere with goals that have low expectancy-value products. In other words, “good 160 
goals” are goals that are facilitated by, but do not conflict with, other “good goals.” Extending 161 
this definition to goal systems, a “good goal system” is a system of multiple goals that have high 162 
expectancy-value products, strong facilitative relations with other high expectancy-value goals, 163 
and do not conflict with other goals or only with those with a low expectancy-value product. 164 
This conceptual proposition can be formalized based on the theory of optimal foraging often 165 
used in ethology. We derive this formalization in the next section. 166 
A Mathematical Formalization of Intergoal Relations Based on Optimal Foraging 167 
 The starting point of the mathematical formalization of the goodness of a goal system is 168 
based on research in the area of foraging in animals (see also Segerstrom & Solberg Nes, 2006). 169 
We use a basic definition by Stephens and Krebs (1986, Chapter 2) that specifies the relationship 170 
of factors influencing the average rate of energy intake when foraging. The authors distinguish 171 
between Ts, defined as the time spent searching for a food source, and Th, defined as the time 172 
spent handling the food. These two times then sum up to Ts + Th = Tf, which is the entire time 173 
spent on foraging. If Ef is the net amount of energy gained in Tf, then the resulting rate R that an 174 
animal has to maximize is 175 
.    (1)    176 
 Equation 1 simply states that the resulting rate R increases with the amount of energy 177 
R=
Ef
Ts +Th
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intake and decreases with the time needed to search and handle the food.  In the following, we 178 
propose to rewrite this basic equation in order to make it compatible with an expectancy-value- 179 
approach (see also Charnov & Orians, 1973). To do this, we need to introduce the concept of 180 
encounter with food and assume that these encounters are linearly related to Ts so that we can 181 
express both Ef and Th as linear functions of Ts. If  is the rate of encounters with food items per 182 
time unit, then Ts is the total number of items encountered. In addition, we need to introduce s 183 
as the cost of search per unit time, so that sTs is the total cost of search. When  is the average 184 
energy gained per encounter and  is the average time spent handling, then Ef = Ts  and Th = 185 
Ts . We can now substitute these relationships into Equation 1, so that the rate of energy 186 
intake becomes 187 
.   (2)    188 
 If Ts is canceled out, we arrive at the so-called disc equation originally proposed by 189 
Holling (1959) 190 
.    (3)    191 
 In Holling’s disc equation, the resulting rate of energy intake becomes a function of the 192 
expectancy of encounter with food items (), the average caloric value of the food ( ), the 193 
opportunity costs of time spent searching (s), and the opportunity costs of time spent handling  194 
( ). Note that in this equation the time spent searching (Ts) is no longer relevant. 195 
The disc equation lays the foundation for more complex optimal foraging models that 196 
can, in principle, consider additional factors, such as uncertainty, information processing, 197 
varying danger over time when foraging, possibilities for energy storage, and many more (for a 198 
recent overview, see Stephens, Brown, & Ydenberg, 2007). It is empirically well supported for 199 
e
h e
h
R=
lTse- sTs
Ts +lTsh
R=
le- s
1+lh
e
h
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animals foraging in patches, as well as for animals searching for prey. It has also been 200 
successfully applied as a basic model in the cognitive sciences (e.g., Hills, Jones, & Todd, 2012), 201 
marketing research (e.g., Wells, 2012), and research on personality (e.g., Segerstrom & Solberg 202 
Nes, 2006). For instance, Hills et al. (2012) investigated memory search paths by modeling 203 
between-patch and within-patch search strategies known from optimal foraging. Wells (2012) 204 
investigated consumer decisions and applied optimal foraging theory to conceptualize brand and 205 
product choice, retail choice, temporal issues, as well as social issues in consumer decisions. 206 
Between-patch and within-patch models are applied to understand, for instance, when a 207 
consumer is likely to switch between different brands.  208 
Segerstrom and Solberg Nes (2006) applied foraging theory to study opportunity costs 209 
arising from goal conflict, which makes their paper particularly relevant for the present purpose. 210 
The authors investigated the role of dispositional optimism – i.e., generalized positive outcome 211 
expectancies – for the experience of goal conflict and subjective well-being. They computed a 212 
foraging function taking into account goal value and opportunity costs and argued that 213 
dispositional optimism increases this foraging function, which implies  that optimists are 214 
efficiently balancing the benefits (i.e., goal value) and costs (i.e., opportunity costs) of their 215 
goals. In Study 1, they showed that dispositional optimism is cross-sectionally associated with 216 
conflict due to resource constraints but not with conflict due to incompatible goal attainment 217 
strategies. Hence, optimists tolerate (or even provoke) goal conflicts, presumably because they 218 
believe that their resources will somehow suffice to manage all conflicting goals. They are, 219 
however, not more likely to engage in goals that pull their resource in opposite directions. This 220 
finding is a first indication that optimists have optimized their goal system by increasing goal 221 
value (in striving for many, sometimes conflict goals) and decreasing opportunity costs (in 222 
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striving for coherent goals only). In a second, longitudinal study, the authors calculated the 223 
nominator of the disc equation as a foraging function for good goal pursuit strategy. Results 224 
showed that optimism was indeed significantly related to higher values of this function and that 225 
higher values of the foraging function were in turn related to higher subjective well-being and 226 
better goal progress. The foraging function thus proved useful for describing the psychological 227 
link between personality and psychological outcomes. 228 
 Based on the findings by Segerstrom and Solberg Nes (2006), we see at least two reasons 229 
for applying the disc equation to research on goal systems. First, the definition of a resulting rate 230 
R offers an interesting conceptualization for the goodness of a system of multiple goals. If we 231 
equate the attainment of single goals with the encounter of single items of food, we arrive at a 232 
straightforward definition of an optimal goal system similar to the definition of an optimal 233 
foraging strategy. Based on this definition, people should strive for goals that maximize the 234 
resulting rate by maximizing the product of “expectancy of encounter” and “caloric value,” and 235 
minimizing opportunity costs of “searching” and “handling.”  236 
 Second, the factors influencing the resulting rate R in optimal foraging can easily be 237 
translated into concepts that have long been successfully applied in motivational psychology. 238 
Hence, the expectancy to encounter forage  can be considered the attainment probability of a 239 
goal within the expectance-value-framework. Similarly, the caloric value of the food  resembles 240 
the incentive value of a goal, and hence its importance. The net search costs s represent 241 
opportunity costs that, within a multiple goals framework, translate into costs that derive from 242 
conflicts between goals and are alleviated by intergoal facilitation.  243 
Finally, the time spent handling represents resources that are invested or costs that 244 
arise after a goal has been attained. Note that resources invested during goal striving are already 245 
e
h
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captured by the search costs s in the disc equation. The handling costs parameter , in contrast, 246 
is weighted by the expectancy of attainment probability parameter , and thus only becomes 247 
relevant after a goal has been attained. There are good theoretical reasons for setting this 248 
parameter to zero in the context of human goal striving. By definition, as has already been noted 249 
by James (1890), goals can be considered as end states  that do not require further investment of 250 
resources once they are attained (for an overview, see Austin & Vancouver, 1996). The same 251 
seems to hold when a goal is abandoned (maybe due to low subjective probably of attainment or 252 
because circumstances have changed so that it is no longer desirable). Clearly, if a goal is no 253 
longer active (either because it has been attained or because it was abandoned), it does not incur 254 
any handling costs.  Of course, new goals may arise after attaining a goal or might replace an 255 
abandoned goal.  However, these are new goals, and the costs of their pursuits do not represent 256 
handling costs of the old goals. For these reasons, we set this parameter to zero, which simplifies 257 
the numerator of the disc equation to unity. Note, that the resources invested during goal striving 258 
are considered in the search costs part of the equation.  259 
 Accepting these assumptions, we can now translate the disc equation for optimal foraging 260 
into a disc equation for multiple goals striving. For any single goal i, the core of this equation is 261 
,    (4)    262 
where Ri represents the resulting rate of a goal. As in the original disc equation, the resulting rate 263 
is a function of the expectancy i of a goal and its value ei. This definition is compatible with the 264 
core of traditional expectancy-value-models in motivational psychology. Within a multiple goal 265 
framework, the opportunity cost s is a function of intergoal relations, namely, conflicts and 266 
facilitations with other goals j = 1…(n-1) that originate from goal i. In defining the opportunity 267 
costs, we take into account both the strength of conflict and facilitation with another goal j and 268 
h
Ri = liei
GOAL CONFLICT AND GOAL FACILITATION 
 
13 
this goal’s expectancy-value product. For conflicting goal relations, we therefore subtract from 269 
Equation 4 the sum of the products of conflict strength originating from goal i, and affecting goal 270 
j (i.e., Cij) and expectancy-value of the conflicting goal j (i.e., jej) for all goals j = 1…(n-1) so 271 
that  272 
.    (5)    273 
 In Equation 5, the resulting rate Ri of a goal thus proportionally decreases if this goal 274 
stands in stronger conflict with many goals that have a higher expectancy-value product. If the 275 
conflicts originating from goal i are not very strong or the expectancy-value product of the 276 
conflicting goals j is low, then the resulting rate is less affected. We can do the same for 277 
facilitative relations between goals, and add to Equation 5 the sum of the products of facilitation 278 
strength originating from goal i and affecting goal j (i.e., Fij) and expectancy-value product of the 279 
goal j that is facilitated (i.e., jej) for all goals j = 1…(n-1) so that 280 
.   (6)    281 
 Equation 6 describes the resulting rate of a single goal i as a function of its own 282 
expectancy-value, as well as the conflicting and facilitative relations it has with other goals j = 283 
1…(n-1) weighted by these goals’ expectancy-value product. We can do this for every goal i = 284 
1…n in the goal system so that the resulting rate R of a goal system is 285 
.    (7)    286 
From Equation 7, one can see that the resulting rate of a goal system R is higher the more 287 
single goals in this goal system have high individual resulting rates. Taken together, the resulting 288 
rate of a goal system can be maximized by having many goals with high expectancy-value 289 
Ri = liei - Cijl jej
j=1
n-1
å
Ri = liei - Cijl jej
j=1
n-1
å + Fijl jej
j=1
n-1
å
R= Ri
i=1
n
å
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products that do not conflict with each other, but instead have strong facilitative associations. 290 
These intergoal associations of conflict and facilitation are weighted by the expectancy-value 291 
products of the other goals. 292 
This framework raises two questions. The first question concerns the adequate 293 
operationalization of the single components in Equation 6; the second question concerns the 294 
adequate metrics of these components. Concerning operationalization, it would be possible, to 295 
some extent, to use objective indicators of expectancy, value, conflict, and facilitation. However, 296 
it seems more meaningful from a psychological perspective to use subjective appraisals, because 297 
these appraisals constitute people’s psychological reality that is more relevant to predict 298 
individual behavior than objective indicators. This notion, sometimes referred to as the Thomas 299 
theorem, has also found empirical support in the goal literature (e.g., Mangos & Steele-Johnson, 300 
2010). Expectancy , then, can be operationalized as the subjective estimation of goal attainment 301 
probability, value e can be operationalized as the subjective value of a goal or goal importance, 302 
and conflict C as well as facilitation F can be operationalized as subjective estimations of the 303 
conflict resp. facilitation potential that originates from a goal. All of these subjective 304 
operationalizations have been successfully used in previous research (e.g., Eccles & Wigfield, 305 
2002; Riediger & Freund, 2008).  306 
Concerning adequate metrics, two groups of variables in Equation 6 need to be 307 
distinguished. For expectancy  and value e, any metric, such as a rating scale ranging from 0 to 308 
7 or percentages ranging from 0% to 100%, can be used, as the choice of the metric does not 309 
change the meaning of R, but only affects the scale at which it is represented. In the following, 310 
we will use a scale ranging from 0 to 1 to represent  and e. For conflict C and facilitation F, 311 
however, the choice of the metric is not trivial, as it directly influences the weighting of the other 312 
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goals in determining the opportunity costs from intergoal conflict and opportunity benefits from 313 
intergoal facilitation. Using nominally larger metrics gives conflict and facilitation a greater 314 
weight, and using nominally smaller metrics marginalizes the effect of these variables. Here, 315 
more theoretical work and/or empirical investigation is needed, and we can only speculate that 316 
the choice of the adequate metric depends on factors, such as the temporal scope of the goals 317 
investigated or their level of abstractness. In the following, we use a metric ranging from 0 to 1 318 
to represent C and F. The choice of this metric basically assumes that the expectancy-value 319 
product of one goal can cancel out the expectancy-value product of another goal if the two goals 320 
are extremely conflicting (C = 1; e.g., taking one week off and working one week very hard); or 321 
that the expectancy-value product of one goal fully adds to the expectancy-value of another goal 322 
if the two goals perfectly facilitate each other (F = 1; e.g., finding a job and earning money). 323 
Note that in reality most Cs and Fs will be somewhere in-between 0 and 1.  324 
Empirical Usefulness of the Goodness Index: Research Questions 325 
 The purpose of this paper is not only to attempt an integration of intergoal relations 326 
within an expectancy-value framework and to provide its mathematical formalization, but also to 327 
offer some empirical evidence about the usefulness of the concept. In order to do so, we have 328 
formulated predictions about the antecedents, the correlates, and the consequences of a “good 329 
goal system” as defined above. In the following, we will give an overview of these predictions, 330 
starting with variables directly related to the goal and concluding with variables related to the 331 
person.  332 
Goal-Related Constructs 333 
 Having a “good goal system” should be associated with a more optimized investment of 334 
goal-related resources and positively predict goal-related constructs, such as progress of goal 335 
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attainment or proximity of a goal, both at the objective and at the subjectively perceived level. 336 
This should hold for both single goals in the goal system and the goal system as a whole. Thus, 337 
we hypothesized that a higher resulting rate R is positively correlated with these variables.  338 
 Goal Focus 339 
 When pursuing goals, people may either adopt an outcome focus by attending more to the 340 
goal’s end (or why they want to reach a goal); or they may adopt a process focus by attending 341 
more to the goal-relevant means (or how they want to reach it; Freund & Hennecke, 2015). At 342 
the first glance, the concept of goal focus might resemble related concepts such as 343 
extrinsic/intrinsic motivation (e.g., Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999) and performance/mastery 344 
orientation (e.g., Dweck & Leggett, 1998). However, there are also clear distinctions (for a 345 
detailed discussion, see Freund, Hennecke, & Mustafić, 2012). For instance, although intrinsic 346 
motivation entails a focus on the process and extrinsic motivation on the consequences of 347 
attaining a certain outcome, the opposite is not true. Both process and outcome focus can be 348 
either extrinsically or intrinsically motivated. Freund et al. (2012) argue that adopting a process 349 
focus as opposed to an outcome focus is beneficial for goal engagement in the long run, because 350 
it offers opportunities for positive rewards by the very pursuit of a goal.  351 
Indeed, outcome and process focus have been shown to be differentially associated with 352 
other goal-related variables, goal pursuit, and affective well-being, with process focus showing 353 
more positive effects (e.g., Freund, Riediger, & Hennecke, &, 2010). We, too, hypothesize that 354 
adopting a process focus is beneficial for a high resulting rate R, because people who focus on 355 
the means while pursuing goals should be more sensitive to the facilitative and interfering 356 
relations between goals that, as outlined above, usually exist at the level of strategies and goal- 357 
relevant resources. This higher sensitivity, in turn, should result in an optimization of the means 358 
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so that more facilitation and less interference occur. If this is the case, a higher R could explain 359 
why process focus is associated with more goal engagement and persistence during goal striving. 360 
Goal Disengagement 361 
 If goals are highly unlikely or impossible to attain, goal disengagement is usually 362 
associated with positive adjustment and development, as it helps people to save resources that 363 
would otherwise be wasted into unpromising goal striving, to avoid repeated experiences of 364 
failure, and allow to redirect resources into goals that are more likely attainable (Tomasik & 365 
Salmela-Aro, 2012; Tomasik & Silbereisen, 2012; Tomasik, Silbereisen, & Heckhausen, 2010; 366 
Wrosch et al., 2003). In the present paper, we relate the resulting rate R both as an antecedent 367 
and as a consequence of goal disengagement. First, we hypothesize that persons with a goal 368 
system of a low resulting rate R are more likely to disengage from one or more goals compared 369 
to persons with a higher resulting rate R. In other words, we expect that a lower resulting rate R 370 
is one of the driving forces that instigate goal disengagement, presumably because these goals do 371 
not fit well into the goal system. Second, we hypothesized that, after disengagement, the 372 
resulting rate R of a goal system increases. Although re-engaging with a new goal does not 373 
necessarily result in a more adaptive goal system in every single case, at least on average this 374 
should be the case if intergoal relations and available resources are optimized over time. 375 
Personality Constructs 376 
 Numerous studies have investigated the relation between personality (broadly defined) 377 
and goals or goal systems that people hold (e.g., Roberts & Robins, 2000), providing evidence 378 
that personality is related to different aspects of goals (including their domain and specific 379 
content) and goal-related behavior (including goal engagement and persistence in goal striving). 380 
From the perspective of the Big Five concept of personality (e.g., John & Srivastava, 1999), 381 
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three constructs stand out that are likely associated with a “good goal system.” If one considers 382 
that people who can select from a broader variety of existing goals are probably more likely to 383 
arrive at a more adaptive selection, openness to experience should be associated with a higher 384 
resulting rate R. Second, the adaptive organization of a goal system requires some amount of 385 
discipline, which is a central aspect of conscientiousness. Furthermore, it requires being steadfast 386 
against impulsiveness and irritability, which is the opposite of neuroticism. Research by Emmons 387 
and King (1998) has demonstrated that neuroticism is also correlated with more goal conflict. In 388 
contrast, extraversion and agreeableness are probably less relevant for goal striving. We 389 
therefore hypothesized that openness to experience and conscientiousness are positively related 390 
to the resulting rate R of a goal system, whereas the relation with neuroticism is negative.  391 
Subjective Well-Being  392 
 People who have goal systems that are characterized by a high resulting rate R should 393 
also be more successful in progressing towards, and eventually attaining, their goals. If this is 394 
true, a high resulting rate R should be positively associated with variables indicating successful 395 
development in terms of subjective well-being, such as satisfaction with life or positive affect.  396 
Chronological Age  397 
 Goal systems seem to become more facilitative and less conflicting with advancing age 398 
(Riediger, 2007). This fact may either represent a manifestation of the increasing structural 399 
integration of different aspects of life and personality with increasing age (see Erikson, 1959), 400 
but may also be a reflection of the increasingly negative dynamics of developmental gains and 401 
losses, which requires a selective optimization of the aging individual’s diminishing resources by 402 
focusing on those goals that support each other and selecting out those that conflict with other 403 
goals (Riediger & Freund, 2006). Regardless of the processes underlying the association of age 404 
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with a less conflicting and more facilitative goal system, we hypothesized that age is positively 405 
correlated with the resulting rate R of a goal system. 406 
Overview of the Present Studies 407 
We tested this hypothesis using correlative data from three studies. Study 1 is a 408 
correlative self-report study with working adults with family, and who thus need to negotiate 409 
goals in the domains of work, family, and leisure. Study 2 is a study on adults starting to exercise 410 
and, in addition to self-report, comprises data on exercising directly obtained from the sports 411 
facilities. Study 3, finally, is a self-report study sampling undergraduate students and obtained 412 
data on as many as 10 goals from each participant. The data sets of these studies were used in 413 
previous publications but our research questions and corresponding analyses substantially differ 414 
from those in the previous publications.1 Correlations of all variables analyzed are available as 415 
an online supplement to this paper. 416 
Study 1 conformed to and was approved by the ethics committee of the Psychology 417 
Department at the University of Zurich. The protocol of Study 2 was in line with the ethics 418 
guidelines of the Max Planck Society and was approved by the Institute’s ethics committee. 419 
Study 3 was reviewed and approved by the University of Exeter Psychology Department's ethics 420 
committee that scrutinizes research in accordance with the British Psychological Society ethical 421 
code of conduct. 422 
Study 1 423 
Sample and Procedure 424 
Data of Study 1 comes from a three-wave longitudinal study on multiple goals with a 425 
time lag of six months between the measurements conducted in Switzerland (for a description of 426 
the study at T1 and participation criteria see Freund, Knecht, & Wiese, 2014, for a description of 427 
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all three waves see Knecht, Wiese, & Freund, 2016). The initial sample at T1 comprised N = 277 428 
employed young and middle-aged adults, 57% of them were women. Mean age of the 429 
participants was M = 41.76 years (SD = 7.19 years).  Regarding education, 34.3% held a 430 
university degree, and 15.9 % had graduated from an applied college. Almost 70% of the 431 
participants had at least one child. The sample attrition over time was fairly low with n = 253 432 
(91%) at T2 and n = 248 (90%) at T3 staying in the study. N = 237 (86%) provided data at all 433 
three measurement occasions.  434 
At the first measurement point, participants were asked to name six of their current 435 
personal goals, two each in the life domains of work, family, and leisure. At the follow-ups, 436 
participants had to indicate whether they were still pursuing all of these goals. If not, they had to 437 
replace the abandoned goal with a new one within the same life domain. Goals that were not 438 
meaningful or did not represent goals according to our definition were removed, resulting in an 439 
effective sample size of n = 269 (T1), n = 237 (T2), and n = 233 (T3). Complete data on all three 440 
measurement occasions were provided by N = 218 participants.  441 
Measures 442 
 Variables for calculating the goodness of a goal system. For each of the six goals, 443 
participants were asked to indicate on six-point scales (ranging from 0 to 5) the importance of 444 
the respective goal (“How important is this goal to you?” with responses anchored at “not at all 445 
important” and “extremely important”; Freund & Knecht, 2015) and goal attainment probability 446 
(“How certain are you to realize/to successfully pursue the goal?” with responses anchored at 447 
“very uncertain” and “very certain”). Furthermore, using a procedure introduced by Riediger and 448 
Freund (2004), participants were asked to indicate for each pair of goals how much one goal 449 
stood in conflict with the other one (“How much do the two goals hinder each other? [Goal A] 450 
GOAL CONFLICT AND GOAL FACILITATION 
 
21 
hinders [goal B]:” with responses anchored at “not at all” and “very strongly”) and how much 451 
one goal facilitated the other one (“How much do the two goals facilitate each other? [Goal A] 452 
facilitates [goal B]:” with responses anchored at “not at all” and “very strongly”). Note that, for 453 
the assessment of goal conflict and goal facilitation, each goal pair was rated twice, where a goal 454 
either was the source or the target of conflict or facilitation, resp. Altogether, there were 30 455 
ratings of goal conflict and 30 ratings of goal facilitation at each measurement occasion (Knecht 456 
& Freund, 2015). Goal conflict and goal facilitation were correlated moderately negatively 457 
within domains (T1: -.31 < r < -.27; T2: -.43 < r < -.29; T3: -.39 < r < -.23) and virtually 458 
uncorrelated across domains (T1: -.10 < r < .00; T2: -.12 < r < .06; T1: -.06 < r < .02), and hence 459 
were not redundant. Correlation coefficients for the same pair of goals were quite substantial for 460 
the two reciprocal measures of conflict (T1: .47 < r < .76; T2: .50 < r < .80; T3: .55 < r < .78), as 461 
well as for the two reciprocal measures of facilitation (T1: .45 < r < .81; T2: .54 < r < .80; T1: 462 
.57 < r < .81). Thus, there is substantial overlap of conflict and facilitation in both directions (i.e., 463 
if engaging in sports conflicts with spending time with children, spending time with children is 464 
also likely to hinder engaging in sports). 465 
For each goal i of each participant, we computed the resulting rate Ri according to 466 
Equation (6). Based on this, for each participant’s goal system, we computed the resulting rate R 467 
according to Equation (7).2 Using C = [0..1], F = [0..1], and all other variables in their original 468 
metric in Equation 6, the mean of the resulting rate R for the overall goal system comprising six 469 
goals was M = 6.91 (SD = 6.27; range from -6.73 to 36.00) for T1, M = 6.64 (SD = 6.51; range 470 
from -6.92 to 36.00) for T2, and M = 6.96 (SD = 6.04; range from –8.84 to 33.60) for T3. 471 
Goal-related constructs. For each of the six goals, participants were asked to indicate on 472 
six-points scales (ranging from 0 to 5): (1) progress made towards the goals in the last two or 473 
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three weeks (“Have you come closer to your goal?” with responses anchored at “not at all” and 474 
“very much”), (2)  satisfaction with goal progress (“How satisfied are your right now with 475 
regard to your goal and goal progress?” with responses anchored at “not at all satisfied” and 476 
“extremely satisfied”), (3) perceived proximity to goal attainment (“How close are you in your 477 
opinion to the attainment of your goal?” with responses anchored at “very far away” to 478 
“attained”), as well as (4)  prospective engagement in the next six months (“In the following six 479 
months: How much do you expect to do for your goal?” with responses anchored at “nothing” 480 
and “extremely much”). For each of these four constructs, we averaged the responses across the 481 
six goals. The measures were assessed at all three measurement occasions (progress T1: M = 482 
2.31, SD = .92; T2: M = 2.81, SD = .87; T3: M = 2.94, SD = .85; satisfaction with goal progress 483 
T1: M = 2.49, SD = .88; T2: M = 2.83, SD = .88; T3: M = 2.95, SD = .85; perceived proximity 484 
T1: M = 2.40, SD = .77; T2: M = 2.81; SD = .77; T3: M = 2.92, SD = .81; prospective 485 
engagement T1: M = 3.55, SD = .67; T2: M = 3.45, SD = .70; T3: M = 3.50, SD = .72). 486 
 Goal focus. For each of the six goals, participants were asked to indicate on six-point 487 
scales (ranging from 0 to 5) how much they focused on the means of goal pursuit (process focus; 488 
“When pursuing your goal, how much are you guided by the motto: ‘The journey is the 489 
destination’?” with responses anchored at “not at all” and “much”) and on the outcome of goal 490 
pursuit (outcome focus; “When pursuing your goals, how much are your guided by the motto: 491 
‘The most important thing is that I achieve my goal – how I do so does not play a big role’?” 492 
with responses anchored at “not at all” and “much”). This measure has previously been used 493 
successfully in different studies (see Freund & Hennecke, 2015). Responses were averaged 494 
across the six goals to arrive at an overall measure of process and outcome focus. The measures 495 
were assessed at all three measurement occasions (process focus T1: M = 3.13, SD = 1.23; T2: M 496 
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= 3.19, SD = 1.13; T3: M = 3.26, SD = 1.17; outcome focus T1: M = 2.68, SD = 1.27; T2: M = 497 
2.43, SD = 1.27; T3: M = 2.61, SD = 1.34). 498 
 Goal disengagement. At T2 and T3, participants were presented the six goals that they 499 
had listed at T1 and asked whether they still pursued each of them. Between T1 and T2, 59.3% 500 
of the participants confirmed that this was the case, whereas 23.3% no longer pursued one of 501 
their six goals, 10.7% no longer pursued two of their six goals, and the remaining 6.7% no longer 502 
pursued three or more of their six goals. Between T2 and T3, respectively, the numbers were 503 
very similar to 59.3% of all participants who retained all six goals, 22.2% who dropped one goal, 504 
11.3% who dropped two goals, and 7.2% who dropped three or more goals. If a goal was no 505 
longer up to date, participants were asked to nominate a new goal in the respective life domain 506 
and assessed all goal-related information with regard to this new nomination. 507 
 For the following analyses, we computed a new grouping variable for each of the six 508 
goals indicating whether the respective goal had remained stable throughout the course of the 509 
study or whether participants changed it at least once. Based on this operationalization, 23.7% of 510 
the participants changed the primary work goal, 25.2% the secondary work goal, 16.8%, the 511 
primary family goal, 14.5% the secondary family goal, 17.9% the primary leisure goal, and 512 
19.8% the secondary leisure goal. 513 
 Personality constructs.  As reported in Freund et al. (2014), this study used the German 514 
short version of the Big Five inventory by Rammstedt and John (2005). Internal consistencies at 515 
T1 and one-year stabilities between T1 and T3 were  = .75 and rtt = .81 for neuroticism,  = .84 516 
and rtt = .77 for extraversion,  = .71 and rtt = .77 for openness to new experience,  = .61 and rtt 517 
= .74 for agreeableness, and  = .66 and rtt = .71 for conscientiousness.  518 
 Indicators of subjective well-being. A German version of the Satisfaction with Life 519 
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Scale by Diener, Emmons, Larsen and Griffin (1985) was used to assess general satisfaction with 520 
life (for details, see Knecht et al., 2016). The internal consistency of this scale at T1 was  = .86, 521 
and the one-year stability between T1 and T3 was rtt = .74. The short version of the 522 
multidimensional mood questionnaire by Steyer, Schwenkmezger, Notz and Eid (1997) assessed 523 
positive affect. This questionnaire comprises the subscales “bad-good,” “tired-awake,” and 524 
“uneasy-calm,” which were collapsed to one single scale for positive affect. The internal 525 
consistency of this scale at T1 was  = .91, and the one-year stability between T1 and T3 was rtt 526 
= .65. 527 
Chronological age. Age was assessed by self-report and ranged from 30 to 55 years. 528 
Results 529 
 Goal-related constructs. To test the hypothesis that a higher resulting rate of a goal 530 
system is associated with more favorable appraisals on the goal-related constructs, we first 531 
computed zero-order correlations at all three measurement occasions. A higher resulting rate was 532 
positively correlated with perceived progress (T1: r = .27, p < .001; T2: r = .30, p < .001; T3: r = 533 
.37, p < .001), satisfaction with goal progress (T1: r = .26, p < .001; T2: r = .31, p < .001; T3: r = 534 
.32, p < .001), perceived proximity of goal attainment (T1: r = .32, p < .001; T2: r = .31, p < 535 
.001; T3: r = .35, p < .001), and prospective engagement (T1: r = .47, p < .001; T2: r = .46, p < 536 
.001; T3: r = .44, p < .001). 537 
 In order to test the direction of these effects over time, we set up cross-lagged panel 538 
models for the three waves of data. For each goal-related construct, a separate model was set up. 539 
Both the resulting rate R and the goal-related construct were modeled as latent variables with 540 
three indicators each, one for each domain of life. Measurement invariance across time was 541 
tested and established, and also the respective structural paths were fixed to be equal across time, 542 
GOAL CONFLICT AND GOAL FACILITATION 
 
25 
which did not negatively affect the model fit.  543 
Results of the cross-lagged panel models are summarized in Table 1. Overall, all four 544 
models fit the data very well, and all four showed a consistent picture with the resulting rate R at 545 
measurement point t predicting residual change in the goal-related construct at measurement 546 
point t + 1. More specifically, a higher resulting rate R predicted an increase in perceived 547 
progress (T1: β = .22, p < .001; T2: β = .26, p < .001), satisfaction with goal progress (T1: β = 548 
.12, p = .04; T2: β = .14, p = .04), perceived proximity of goal attainment (T1: β = .17, p = .01; 549 
T2: β = .16, p = .01), and prospective engagement (T1: β = .25, p = .04; T2: β = .26, p = .05). 550 
Hence, a more optimized goal system was beneficial for negotiating one’s goals. It is worth 551 
noting that prospective engagement was the only goal-related construct that was associated with 552 
the resulting rate R in the other causal direction (T1: β = .29, p < .001; T2: β = .34, p < .001). 553 
Thus, participants who intended to be more engaged in pursuing their goals in the future reported 554 
to have a more optimized goal system at the next measurement occasion. At the same time, those 555 
who had a more optimized goal system also engaged more. 556 
 Goal focus. To test the hypothesis that a higher resulting rate is associated with a higher 557 
process focus, but not with a higher outcome focus, we computed zero-order correlations. Again, 558 
a higher resulting rate was associated with a higher process focus (T1: r = .41, p < .001; T2: r = 559 
.32, p < .001; T3: r = .35, p < .001) but, with one exception, not with a higher outcome focus 560 
(T1: r = .02, p = .78; T2: r = .14, p = .03; T3: r = .04, p = .51). 561 
Using cross-lagged panel analyses as described above, we found that a higher process 562 
focus only marginally significantly predicted residual change in the resulting rate between T1 563 
and T2 ( = .08, p =.09) and between T2 and T3  = .07, p = .10). Also, the coefficients in the 564 
other direction also were only marginally significant if tested two-tailed (T1: β = .09, p = .07; 565 
GOAL CONFLICT AND GOAL FACILITATION 
 
26 
T2: β = .10, p = .07). Despite the relatively high zero-order correlations between process focus 566 
and the resulting rate, our hypothesis thus was only marginally confirmed.  Model fit and all 567 
model coefficients can be found in Table 1, which, for the sake of completeness, also includes 568 
the result for outcome focus. 569 
 Goal disengagement. For each of the six goals, we first tested whether the goal-specific 570 
resulting rate Ri at T1 was significantly smaller for participants who subsequently nominated a 571 
new goal. This was the case for the primary work goal, t(253) = 2.62, p = .01 and the primary 572 
leisure goal, t(253) = 1.98, p = .05, but not for any of the other four goals (.11 < p < .84). Hence, 573 
some goals that were more likely to be abandoned during the course of the study had a 574 
significantly lower goal-specific resulting rate Ri at the study’s outset. 575 
 In a next step, we tested whether a goal shift was succeeded by an increase in the 576 
respective resulting rate Ri. For each of the six goals, we computed a repeated measures ANOVA 577 
with the goal-specific resulting rate Ri as the dependent variable at the three measurement 578 
occasions, time as the within-subject factor, and whether or not the respective goal was changed 579 
at least once as the between-subject factor. Using this analysis, we primarily tested for a time  580 
goal change interaction term, indicating that Ri changed differently depending on whether or not 581 
a participant changed the goal. This was the case for the primary work goal, F(2, 432) = 4.09, p = 582 
.02, the primary family goal, F(2, 432) = 4.35, p = .01, and marginally for the primary leisure 583 
goal, F(2, 432) = 2.43, p = .09, but not for any of the secondary goals (.26 < p < .70). These 584 
results are depicted in Figure 1. 585 
 In sum, the hypothesis that goal shifts were preceded by a relatively lower goal-specific 586 
resulting rate Ri and resulted in its increase was confirmed for the primary, but not for the 587 
secondary, goals. A depiction of the goal-specific trajectories of the resulting rate Ri is presented 588 
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in Figure 1.  589 
 Personality constructs. To explore associations of the resulting rate R with personality, 590 
we computed zero-order correlations for each of the three measurement occasions. For T1, our 591 
hypotheses were confirmed. A higher resulting rate R was positively correlated with 592 
conscientiousness (r = .17; p = .01) and with openness to new experience (r = .14; p = .02), but 593 
not with any of the other three of the Big Five. At T2, a higher resulting rate was only correlated 594 
with openness to new experience (r = .13, p < .04), but not with any other of the personality 595 
constructs (.07 < p < .19). At T3, a higher resulting rate was, as expected, correlated with 596 
conscientiousness (r = .14; p = .04), openness to new experience (r = .18; p = .01), and 597 
neuroticism (r = -.15; p = .02). Unexpectedly, we also found significant correlations with 598 
extraversion (r = .17; p = .01) and agreeableness (r = .18; p = .01). 599 
 Using regression analyses to predict residual change in the resulting rate R, we found that 600 
only openness for experience predicted an increase in R between T1 and T2 ( = .11, p = .03). 601 
However, we could not replicate this finding between T2 and T3, and none of the other 602 
personality constructs significantly predicted change of the resulting rate R over time. Taken 603 
together, we have to conclude that, although our hypotheses with regard to personality were 604 
confirmed for T1, the associations were rather weak and not robust over time. 605 
 Indicators of subjective well-being. In order to test the hypothesis that a higher resulting 606 
rate R is associated with better subjective well-being, we computed for each measurement 607 
occasion zero-order correlations between the resulting rate R, on the one hand, and satisfaction 608 
with life as well as mood, on the other. Contrary to our hypotheses, none of these correlations (- 609 
.04 < r < .12) was significant (.06 < p < .75), with the only exception that positive affect was 610 
positively correlated with the resulting rate at T3 (r = .15, p < .02).  611 
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Chronological age. We found a small, but significant, correlation between the resulting 612 
rate R and chronological age at all three measurement occasions (.16 < r < .17; .01 < p < .02), 613 
which confirmed our hypothesis that older participants report more optimized goal systems.  614 
Discussion 615 
 Study 1 provides evidence that the goodness of a goal system as indexed by a higher 616 
resulting rate R is correlated with higher perceived goal progress, satisfaction with the goal, 617 
perceived proximity of goal attainment, as well as prospective engagement. Also as expected, 618 
process focus, but not outcome focus, was associated with a higher resulting rate. Further support 619 
for the validity of the resulting rate as an index of the goodness of a goal system was obtained 620 
from the analyses on goal shifts. For most of the primary goals, a shift was predicted by a 621 
relatively low resulting rate at the previous measurement occasion, and entailed a higher 622 
resulting rate the next time it was measured. In other words, people changed goals that did not fit 623 
well with their goal system and switched to goals that were more adaptive in this regard. 624 
 Results relating to the association of resulting rate with personality factors, indicators of 625 
subjective well-being, and age were less promising. Although conscientiousness and openness to 626 
experience were positively correlated with a higher overall resulting rate, the effect sizes of these 627 
correlations were rather small. Moreover, subjective well-being was not correlated with the 628 
measure for the goodness of a goal system. Although there was some evidence for the expected 629 
association of age resulting rate, the effect size was quite small. Note, however, that different 630 
from other studies that found stronger relations between age and goal conflict, as well as 631 
facilitation across adulthood, the age range in the present sample was restricted to middle 632 
adulthood.  633 
 In sum, Study 1 provides initial empirical evidence for the usefulness of the foraging 634 
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theory approach for analyzing multiple goal systems. The strengths of this study are its 635 
longitudinal design, the ideographic assessment of personal goals and their intergoal relations at 636 
all measurement occasions, as well as the low attrition rate. Limitations are the exclusive reliance 637 
on self-reports concerning goal engagement and the restricted age range. These limitations were 638 
addressed in the subsequent study. 639 
Study 2 640 
 While Study 1 relied exclusively on self-reports concerning goal engagement, Study 2 641 
included, in addition to many of the measures used in Study 1, also an objective measure of goal 642 
engagement. Study 2, therefore, serves both as a replication and an extension of Study 1. 643 
Sample and Procedure 644 
Data of this study were assessed at the Max Planck Institute for Human Development in 645 
Berlin, Germany (see Riediger et al., 2005). Participants of this study were n = 99 younger (19 - 646 
35 years) and n = 46 older (55 years and older) sports beginners who were recruited from sports 647 
facilities, such as fitness centers and sports clubs (see Riediger et al., 2005, for further details on 648 
the study). Most of the participants were female (74.5%), and the majority (59.3%) had 649 
graduated from Gymnasium (i.e., the highest school track in Germany). Participants filled out 650 
self-report questionnaires at the beginning of the study (T1) and then approximately four months 651 
later (T2). At T1, participants were asked to nominate three goals that were most important to 652 
them right now, in addition to the goal of starting exercise that all of them shared. At T1 and T2, 653 
participants provided subjective goal evaluations similar to those used in Study 1. In addition, 654 
where possible, objective attendance data based on attendance lists and electronic attendance 655 
registrations were attained by the sports facilities.  656 
Measures 657 
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 Variables for calculating the goodness of a goal system. For each of the four goals, 658 
participants were asked to rate on a seven-point scale (ranging from 1 to 7) the importance of the 659 
respective goals (“Please indicate […] how important each of the four goals is for you 660 
personally” with responses anchored at “very little important” and “extremely important”). 661 
Similarly, goal attainment probability was assessed with the question “How certain are you to 662 
realize/to successfully pursue that goal?” with responses anchored at “very uncertain” and “very 663 
certain.” 664 
 Goal conflict at T1 was assessed for each pair of goals (again, in both directions) with 665 
three items related to resource limitations (“How often can it happen that because of [goal A] 666 
you do not invest as much time as you wanted in [goal B]?”, “How often can it happen that 667 
because of [goal A] you do not bring up as much money for [goal B] as you wanted?”, and “How 668 
often can it happen that because of [goal A] you do not invest as  much power and energy in 669 
[goal B] as you wanted?”), and one item related to logical incompatibility (“How often can it 670 
happen that you do something with regard to [goal A] that is incompatible with [goal B]?” with 671 
all responses anchored at “never/very rarely” and “very often”). Five-point scales (ranging from 672 
1 to 5) were used. For each pair of goals, the respective four items were averaged to indicate 673 
overall goal conflict. More information about this measure is provided in Riediger and Freund 674 
(2004). 675 
 Goal facilitation at T1 was assessed for each pair of goals with one item related to 676 
instrumental relationships (“Striving for [goal A] lays the foundations for realizing [goal B]?” 677 
with responses anchored at “does not at all apply” and “totally applies”) and one item related to 678 
overlapping goal attainment strategies (“How often can it happen that you do something for [goal 679 
A] that at the same time is conducive to [goal B]?” with responses anchored at “never/very 680 
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rarely” and “very often”). Five-point scales (ranging from 1 to 5) were used. For each pair of 681 
goals, the respective two items were averaged to indicate overall goal facilitation (see Riediger & 682 
Freund, 2004). Conflict and facilitation for each goal pair were mostly uncorrelated or correlated 683 
negatively (-.34 < r < .05). 684 
Based on the scores for goal importance, attainment probability, goal conflict, and goal 685 
facilitation, we computed the resulting rates in the same way as we did in Study 1. The mean of 686 
the resulting rate R for the overall goal system at T1 was M = 4.03 (SD = 2.49; range from .04 to 687 
14.69). We could not compute the same measure for T2. 688 
 Goal-related constructs. Subjective progress made towards each of the four goals was 689 
assessed at T1 and T2 using a seven-point scale (“In the last three or four months/Since our last 690 
session four months ago, have you moved toward that goal or have you moved away from it?” 691 
with responses anchored at “moved very far away” and “moved very far toward that goal.” By 692 
averaging all four responses, we obtained an indicator of goal progress across all four goals (T1: 693 
M = 4.99, SD = .74; T2: M = 4.87, SD = .81). At both T1 and T2, participants were also asked to 694 
indicate their satisfaction with goal progress (“How satisfied are your right now with regard to 695 
your intentions and your development?” with responses anchored at “very dissatisfied” and “very 696 
satisfied”). Again, averaging across the four goals yielded an overall scale (T1: M = 4.71, SD = 697 
.83; T2: M = 4.69, SD = .86). Perceived proximity to goal attainment was assessed using a seven- 698 
point scale at T1 (“How far in your opinion are you currently away from this goal?” with 699 
responses anchored at “very far away” and “very close”) and using an eight-point scale at T2 700 
(same item wording with responses anchored at “very far away” and “goal already attained”). 701 
Averaging across the four goals yielded an overall scale (T1: M = 4.56, SD = .83; T2: M = 4.82, 702 
SD = .93).  703 
GOAL CONFLICT AND GOAL FACILITATION 
 
32 
Prospective engagement for each goal was measured at T1 with a five-point scale (“How 704 
much are you engaged in realizing that intention?” with responses anchored at “very little” and 705 
“very much”). Again, averaging responses across the four goals yielded an overall scale (M = 706 
3.94, SD = .61). Similarly, retrospective engagement was measured at T2. For all four goals, 707 
retrospective engagement was assessed using a seven-point scale (“How much did you engage in 708 
this goal in the last four month since our first interview?” with responses anchored at “very little” 709 
and “very much”). Averaging responses yielded an indicator for overall goal engagement (M = 710 
4.72, SD = .85).  711 
In addition to this general self-report on retrospective engagement for all goals, frequency 712 
of exercising was assessed for each month (“How often did you exercise in [calendar month]?” 713 
with responses anchored at “not at all” and “several times a week” using a four-point scale), 714 
regularity of exercising (“How regularly did you exercise each time in [calendar month]?” with 715 
responses anchored at “very irregularly” and “very regularly” on a five-point scale), and length 716 
of average training session (“On the average, how long did you exercise each time in [calendar 717 
month]?” with responses anchored at “less than half an hour” and “more than two-and-a-half 718 
hours” on a six-point scale). Frequency of exercising was recoded to represent actual days per 719 
month and averaged across all months (M = 5.80, SD = 3.79), exercise regularity was averaged 720 
across all months (M = 3.34, SD = 1.26), and so was average exercise duration (M = 2.81, SD = 721 
1.09), which roughly corresponds to approximately 1.5 to 2 hours per exercise.  722 
In addition to these specific self-reports, objective information on exercise frequency was 723 
available for 107 participants based on information provided by sports facilities. According to 724 
attendance lists and electronic attendance registration data, participants exercised on M = 2.62 725 
(SD = 1.64) days per month on average. The self-report and objective measures were highly 726 
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correlated depending on whether participants exercised only at the sport facility (r = .80, p < 727 
.001) or also in other contexts (r = .51; p < .001). 728 
 Personality constructs. For assessing personality, the German translation of the NEO- 729 
FFI by Borkenau and Ostendorf (1993) was used, from which 30 items were randomly selected 730 
as described by Staudinger, Fleeson and Baltes (1999). Internal consistencies were  = .75 for 731 
neuroticism,  = .50 for extraversion,  = .38 for openness to experience,  = .74 for 732 
conscientiousness, and  = .53 for agreeableness. 733 
Indicators of subjective well-being. The Life Evaluation Scale by Ferring, Filipp, and 734 
Schmidt (1996) was used to address satisfaction with life in general. The internal consistency of 735 
this scale at T1 was  = .88, and the four-months stability was rtt = .76. In order to assess 736 
positive affect “in the last three to four months”, again the short version of the multidimensional 737 
mood questionnaire by Steyer et al. (1997) was used. The internal consistency at T1 was  = .94, 738 
and the four-months stability was rtt = .61. 739 
Chronological age. Age was assessed by self-report at T1. 740 
Results 741 
 Goal-related constructs. A higher resulting rate at T1 was significantly correlated with 742 
subjective progress made (r = .27, p < .001), satisfaction with goal progress (r = .34, p < .001), 743 
prospective engagement (r = .46, p < .001), and perceived proximity to goal attainment (r = .24, 744 
p < .01).  745 
Predicting residual change in all of these variables (except in prospective engagement), 746 
we found significant and quite strong regression coefficients for subjective progress made ( = 747 
.30, p < .001), satisfaction with goal progress ( = .27, p < .01), as well as proximity to goal 748 
attainment ( = .24, p < .01). 749 
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 At T2, a higher resulting rate (measured at T1) was also significantly correlated with 750 
overall retrospective engagement (r = .41, p < .001), self-reported frequency of exercising (r = 751 
.30, p < .01), self-reported regularity of exercising (r = .28, p < .01), self-reported length of an 752 
average training session (r = .23, p < .01), as well as objective frequency of exercising (r = .28, p 753 
< .01) as reported by the sports facilities.  754 
 Personality constructs. Confirming our hypotheses, a higher resulting rate R was 755 
significantly correlated with conscientiousness (r = .18, p = .03) and neuroticism (r = -.18, p = 756 
.04). However, it was not correlated with openness to new experience (r = -.10, p = .24). We also 757 
found a significant correlation with agreeableness (r = .19, p = .02), but not with extraversion (r 758 
= .03, p = .72).  759 
Indicators of subjective well-being. Different from Study 1, a higher resulting rate R 760 
was weakly, but significantly, correlated with life satisfaction (r = .21, p = .01) and with positive 761 
affect (r = .22, p < .01). Furthermore, a higher resulting rate significantly predicted change in 762 
positive affect over time ( = .17, p = .01), but not change in life satisfaction ( = .01, p = .93). 763 
Chronological age. As predicted, age was positively correlated with a higher resulting 764 
rate and, with this more age-diverse sample, the effect size of the correlation was more 765 
substantial than in Study 1, r = .39 (p < .001). Note, however, that the correlation was, although 766 
positive, neither significant within the younger (r = .13, p = .20) nor within the older age group 767 
(r = .19, p = .21) when analyzed separately. This might either be due to the fairly small resulting 768 
sub-sample sizes or to the fact that the age-related differences are mostly between younger and 769 
older adults. 770 
Discussion 771 
 Replicating results from Study 1, we found consistent associations between a higher 772 
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resulting rate R and subjective indicators of goal progress. In addition, we found two out of the 773 
three hypothesized correlations with personality variables. In addition to the subjective 774 
indicators, we also found evidence on an objective level based on data provided by the sports 775 
facilities. People who held a more optimized goal system thus did only report pursuing their 776 
goals in a more engaged way, but actually did so from an objective perspective. 777 
 Different from Study 1, there was also some support for the hypothesis that a higher 778 
resulting rate is associated with better subjective well-being. One of the reasons for this 779 
discrepancy between the two studies might be that, because all sports beginners shared a 780 
common and probably personally salient goal of starting to exercise regularly, successfully 781 
pursuing this goal might have been more relevant for subjective well-being compared to Study 1 782 
in which a broad range of goals at very different levels of goal pursuit was nominated and 783 
investigated. 784 
 Also different from Study 1, we found evidence that older adults held more optimized 785 
goal systems. This might be due to the fact that Study 2 included a broader age range. 786 
Nevertheless, due to the cross-sectional design of the study regarding age effects, it is impossible 787 
to determine if associations with age represent developmental change or might reflect cohort 788 
differences. 789 
Study 3 790 
 Participants in Studies 1 and 2 were asked to generate six or four personally important 791 
goals, respectively. One might argue that four to six goals are not sufficient to represent a 792 
person’s entire goal system. Furthermore, when nominating the most important goals only, the 793 
variance on the importance variable is probably restricted. In Study 3, we therefore tested some 794 
of our hypotheses using a dataset comprising as many as 10 most important goals nominated by 795 
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the participants. Data of this study were retrieved from the UK Data Archive with permission of 796 
the principal investigator Nicholas Moberly, who conducted this study at the University of 797 
Exeter, UK.3  798 
Sample and Procedure  799 
Participants in this study were sampled by convenience from an undergraduate 800 
population at the University of Exeter. Overall, N = 210 mostly female (81%) subjects between 801 
18 and 35 years of age (M = 19.97; SD = 2.48) took part in the first part of the study (T1) where 802 
they, among other things, were asked to generate 10 current goal strivings and rate them on 803 
different dimensions, including intergoal conflict and facilitation. In the second part of the study 804 
conducted one month later (T2), n = 194 participants returned to the laboratory and, again among 805 
other things not analyzed here, retrospectively rated each striving with regard to progress made 806 
and effort invested. More details on sampling and procedure are provided by Moberly and 807 
Dickson (2016). 808 
Measures 809 
 Variables for calculating the goodness of a goal system. All participants were asked to 810 
list at least 10 personal strivings in different domains of life and then select 10 strivings that were 811 
personally most representative. These strivings were then rated by the participants using six- 812 
point scales (ranging from 0 to 5) on 16 different dimensions, including importance (“How 813 
important is this striving to your life [i.e., how committed are you to be successful in this 814 
striving]?”) and expectancy (“In the next month, how successful do you think you will be in this 815 
striving)” with responses anchored at “not at all” and “extremely”). 816 
 Goal facilitation (“Please rate the extent to which pursuing each of the strivings below 817 
makes it easier to pursue each of the strivings on the right.”) and goal conflict (“Please rate the 818 
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extent to which pursuing each of the strivings below makes it more difficult to pursue each of the 819 
strivings on the right.”) were assessed using a form similar to that used by Riediger and Freund 820 
(2004). Participants could rate intergoal facilitation and conflict using a six-point scale (ranging 821 
from 0 to 5) with responses anchored at “not at all” and “extremely”). Again, goal facilitation 822 
and conflict were rated in two directions for each goal pair, which resulted in 90 ratings of goal 823 
facilitation and 90 ratings of goal conflict. Based on all these data, we computed the resulting 824 
rate Ri for each goal according to Equation (6). Figure 2 depicts the means of the single goals’ 825 
resulting rates and makes obvious that goals that are nominated first are not necessarily the ones 826 
with the highest resulting rate. The omnibus test for significant differences between the single 827 
goals was highly significant, F(9, 1881) = 2.77, p < .01. For the following analyses, we 828 
computed the overall resulting rates R based on Equation (7) using all 10 nominated goals. Using 829 
C = [0..1], F = [0..1], and all other variables in their original metric, the mean of the resulting 830 
rate R at T1 was M = 17.73 (SD = 10.93; range from -9.22 to 59.32). We could not compute the 831 
same measure for T2. 832 
 Goal-related constructs. Subjective goal progress was assessed retrospectively for each 833 
goal at T2 with a six-point scale (ranging from 0 to 5) using the item “Over the last month, how 834 
much progress have you made pursuing this striving?” with responses anchored at “none at all” 835 
and “extreme.” Averaging this item across 10 goals resulted in an overall scale (M = 5.37; SD = 836 
1.18). Satisfaction with goal progress was measured for each goal at T1 and T2 on a six-point 837 
scale using the item “Over the last month, how satisfied are you with the amount of progress 838 
made towards this striving?” with responses anchored at “very unsatisfied” and “very satisfied.” 839 
Averaging the responses across all 10 goals resulted in an overall scale of satisfaction (T1: M = 840 
3.12; SD = .68; T2: M = 2.94; SD = .58). 841 
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 Engagement was measured for each goal at T1 generally and at T2 retrospectively. At 842 
both measurement occasions, six-point scales (ranging from 0 to 5) were used with responses 843 
anchored at “none at all” and “extreme.” General engagement was assessed at T1 using the item 844 
“How much energy and effort do you generally expend in trying to be successful in this 845 
striving?” and averaging this item across all 10 goals resulted in an overall scale (M = 3.25; SD = 846 
.53). Retrospective engagement was assessed at T2 using the item “Over the last month, how 847 
much effort have you put into this striving?” and averaging this item across all 10 goals resulted 848 
in an overall scale (M = 2.79; SD = .71). General and retrospective engagement were correlated 849 
at r = .44 (p < .001) 850 
 Goal focus. At T1, participants were asked for each of the 10 goals on a six-point scale 851 
(ranging from 0 to 5) to indicate their awareness of process focus (“You may or may not have a 852 
well-formed idea or plan of how you will go about trying to be successful in your strivings. How 853 
clear an idea do you have of what is required of you in order to be successful in this striving?” 854 
with responses anchored at “not at all” and “extremely”). Although this item does not directly 855 
measure process focus, but rather its awareness, we argue that this awareness is a necessary 856 
condition to apply a process focus when pursuing at least moderately complex goals. We 857 
averaged the responses across the 10 goals to arrive at an overall measure (M = 3.42; SD = .65). 858 
 Personality constructs. The data set comprised a measure of neuroticism from the 859 
Eysenck Personality Questionnaire Short Form (Eysenck, Eysenck, & Barrett, 1985). The 860 
internal consistency of the scale was  = .72 at T1. No other measures of personality were 861 
available in the data set. 862 
 Indicators of subjective well-being. In Study 3, the Beck Depression Inventory-II 863 
(Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996) was administered at T1 and T2 to assess depressive symptoms. 864 
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Internal consistency at T1 was  = .90, and the test-retest stability was rtt = .63 over the course of 865 
one month. 866 
 Chronological age. Age was assessed by self-report at T1. Participants’ age ranged from 867 
18 to 35 years with 95% of the sample being younger than 23 years. 868 
Results 869 
 Goal-related constructs. A higher overall resulting rate R was positively correlated with 870 
subjective progress made at T2 (r = .32, p < .001), satisfaction with goal progress at T1 (r = .46, 871 
p < .001) and T2 (r = .23, p < .01), as well as general engagement at T1 (r = .51, p < .001) and 872 
retrospective engagement (r = .38, p < .001) at T2. In addition, a higher resulting rate 873 
significantly predicted residual change in goal engagement (retrospective engagement at T2 874 
statistically controlling for general engagement at T1;  = .22, p < .01). However, residual 875 
change in satisfaction with goal progress could not be predicted by a higher resulting rate ( = 876 
.02, p = .82). Our hypotheses thus were largely confirmed. 877 
 Goal focus. Awareness of process focus was positively correlated with a higher resulting 878 
rate (r = .36, p < .001), which confirmed our hypotheses. 879 
 Personality constructs. Contrary to our hypotheses, but in line with results of Study 2, 880 
the resulting rate was weakly and only marginally significantly correlated with neuroticism (r = - 881 
.12, p = .08). 882 
Indicators of subjective well-being. A higher resulting rate was significantly correlated 883 
with fewer depressive symptoms at T1 (r = -.20, p < .01), but not or only marginally so at T2 (r = 884 
-.13, p = .08). Moreover, a higher resulting rate did not predict residual change in depressive 885 
symptoms over the course of one month ( = -.01, p = .91). Our hypotheses thus were only partly 886 
confirmed. 887 
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 Chronological age. Chronological age was not correlated with the overall resulting rate, 888 
irrespective of whether the entire sample was considered (r = .00, p = .99) or only participants 889 
younger than 23 years (r = -.02, p = .84). This mimics the findings of Study 2 when only 890 
considering the subsample of younger adults, and suggests that age-related differences only 891 
emerge when considering a larger proportion of the lifespan (e.g., comparing young and older 892 
adults). 893 
Discussion 894 
 Results from Study 3 showed the validity of our measure for the goodness of a goal 895 
system when as many as 10 goals were considered for all four investigated goal-related 896 
constructs, for goal focus, and for the two indicators of well-being. Overall, the correlations of 897 
the resulting rate with goal-related constructs were larger compared to the studies that only 898 
sampled four or six goals. We found no, or only very weak, support concerning personality and 899 
chronological age within this group of young adults.  900 
Summary of Correlative Results and Test of Utility of R 901 
 In order to compare the single correlational findings from the three different studies, we 902 
summarized them in Table 2 and computed average correlation coefficients both unweighted and 903 
weighted by the studies’ sample sizes. The resulting correlation coefficients point to small- and 904 
medium-sized average effect sizes. The three highest correlation coefficients pertain to 905 
prospective engagement, process focus, and satisfaction with goal progress. 906 
 Finally, we wanted to compare the utility of our theoretically derived measure (see 907 
Equation 6) against the benchmark of simply averaging the goal-related appraisals (i.e., 908 
importance, expectation, conflict, and facilitation) by forming a mean composite value M of 909 
these measures without including multiplicative terms and without weighting any of the 910 
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components with jej . The M value thus represents the simplest form of how the different goal- 911 
related indicators can be combined. Then, we repeated all analyses using this value. Table 3 912 
summarizes the correlative results for all three studies. In most instances, the predictive value of 913 
R was superior to that of M. This was also true for the correlations with personality. Although 914 
they were not very large in size for R to begin with, they virtually disappeared for M.  915 
In a next step, we recalculated the cross-lagged panel models for Study 1 to test (a) 916 
whether the M exhibits low retest reliability which could explain the low correlations in Table 3, 917 
and (b) whether R was superior to M in predicting the longitudinal relationships. Table 4 918 
summarizes the results of these analyses. Retest reliability of M was satisfactory (rtt > .50) in all 919 
models. Thus, low reliability cannot explain the lower correlations of M compared to R shown in 920 
Table 3. Moreover, most cross-lagged paths were smaller for M than for R, which again speaks 921 
for the superiority of the theoretically derived measure R.  922 
We then repeated the analyses on goal disengagement of Study 1. Results of these 923 
analyses showed that M significantly differed for the primary, t(260) = 2.20, p = .03, and 924 
secondary, t(259) = 3.52, p = .001, goal in the family domain and the primary goal in the leisure 925 
domain, t(257) = 3.38, p = .001 between those who disengaged from the respective goal and 926 
those who did not. However, only for the secondary leisure goal the time  goal change 927 
interaction term became significant, F(2, 450) = 9.01, p < .001. Hence, although M predicted 928 
disengagement from some goals it did not increase as a consequence of this disengagement. 929 
Thus, although the results for R were also not without some deviations, R seemed to have 930 
produced the more consistent results compared to M.  931 
Finally, we tested with data from Study 2 whether M was significantly correlated with the 932 
objective measures of physical activity and whether it significantly predicted change in the goal- 933 
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related measures over the course of the study. Neither turned out to be the case. Thus, again R 934 
proved superior to M, although both were derived from the very same data. 935 
General Discussion 936 
 The present paper provides some supporting evidence for the usefulness of the resulting 937 
rate R as a theoretically well grounded, efficient, and useful measure for the goodness of a goal 938 
system comprising multiple goals. This measure has its theoretical roots in optimal foraging 939 
models used in ethology and extends psychological expectancy-value models by explicitly 940 
considering the facilitative and interfering relations that multiple goals may have among each 941 
other. It does so by weighting the capacity for facilitation and interference by the expectancy- 942 
value of the facilitative and interfering goals. Hence, goals that facilitate other goals with a high 943 
expectancy-value contribute more to the goodness of a goal system than goals that facilitate other 944 
goals with a low expectancy-value only; and goals that interfere with other goals with a low 945 
expectancy value only deteriorate the goodness of a goal system only weakly compared to goals 946 
that interfere with other goals with a high expectancy-value product. It is worth noting that the 947 
number of goals that contribute to this measure has an effect on the nominal size of the resulting 948 
rate R, but not necessarily on the average resulting rate per goal (see Figure 2). Thus, it seems 949 
possible to compare the different studies regardless of how many goals were assessed.  950 
 One of the strengths of the foraging approach to goal striving is that it considers the 951 
resources invested into goals in the search cost part of the disc equation. In our translation of the 952 
disc equation, these resources are implicitly represented in the conflict part. Under the 953 
assumption that resources are limited and finite, goals requiring many resources will be – all else 954 
being equal – more likely to be conflicting with other goals and vice versa. This implicit 955 
representation of required resources has two main advantages. First, it is not necessary to 956 
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introduce a specific unit or “currency” of the resources invested, but they are represented on the 957 
same scale as the resulting rate. This allows consideration of very different resources (temporal, 958 
physical, psychological, etc.) within the one model. Second, within our framework, all resources 959 
are not considered as equal, but they are weighted adequately by the expectancy-values of the 960 
goals. This weighting is reflected in the overall resulting rate R that represents the goodness of a 961 
goal system. 962 
 The empirical evidence of the three studies suggests that the goodness of a goal system is 963 
positively correlated with a number of goal-related variables, such as goal engagement or 964 
satisfaction with goal progress. Although the data were mostly based on self-reports, we also 965 
provided evidence from one study that included an objective measure of goal engagement. 966 
People whose goal systems are more optimal, according to our definition, are also more likely to 967 
engage in the pursuit of their goals and be satisfied during goal striving. 968 
 Furthermore, we found that people who focus more on the means relevant for goal 969 
striving are more likely to hold a more optimal goal system. Our explanation of this finding is 970 
that people who focus on the means of goal striving are better able to realize means-related 971 
interferences and facilitations, and thus are better able to adjust them so that interference is 972 
reduced and facilitation improved.   973 
We also obtained some evidence that single goals, which are less than optimal as 974 
indicated by a low resulting rate, are more likely to be given up and replaced by goals that better 975 
fit into the goal system. This finding is in line with lifespan theoretical reasoning on selective 976 
optimization (Freund & Baltes, 2002). The resulting rate thus might be a useful indicator of 977 
single goals of which pursuit is maladaptive in the long run, be it because they only have little 978 
valence for the individual, because they are hardly attainable given internal resources and 979 
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external opportunities, because they deteriorate resources that are necessary for the pursuit of 980 
other goals, or because they show too little compatibility with other goals in the goal system. The 981 
goal-specific resulting rate introduced captures all of these four facets that make goals 982 
maladaptive. 983 
 Consistent with other research on age-related differences in intergoal conflict and 984 
facilitation (e.g., Riediger et al., 2007), we also found evidence that the goodness of a goal 985 
system is correlated with age, at least when a broad age range is investigated. However, the 986 
current studies were not designed to investigate age-related differences and, therefore, do not 987 
comprise a sufficiently age-heterogeneous sample that allows systematic testing of age-related 988 
changes across adulthood. The age-related difference emerged between age groups of young vs. 989 
older adults, which probably suggest that it might be the shift in developmental gains and losses 990 
that forces older people to optimize their goal systems in order to make more efficient use of 991 
their restricted resources (e.g., Heckhausen, 1999). An alternative explanation, which we can 992 
neither confirm nor exclude with the present data, is that older adults are more experienced in 993 
optimizing their goal system or that they profit from psychological gains in terms of income, 994 
status, integration, and stabilization of identity that allows them to have more optimized goal 995 
systems. As Study 2 did not include a middle-aged group, it is impossible to determine when the 996 
suggested process occurs and if it takes place gradually, representing a continuous adjustment to 997 
the aging process. Clearly, more research is needed to elucidate this fascinating phenomenon.  998 
 Results were mixed concerning associations of resulting rate R with personality and 999 
subjective well-being. Generally, the strength of associations was rather weak and inconsistent. 1000 
Conscientiousness and openness to experience were most often associated with a high resulting 1001 
rate R, but there were differences between the studies. It might be that some facet-level 1002 
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constructs of personality, such as impulsivity (an aspect of neuroticism) or goal striving (an 1003 
aspect of conscientiousness) would be more useful for predicting a high resulting rate R.4 1004 
However, because a detailed assessment of personality was not the focus of any of the four 1005 
studies and only brief measures of personality were used, we cannot test the associations in more 1006 
detail. Furthermore, although it is likely that personality plays a role in forming a “good goal 1007 
system,” we cannot determine in which phase of setting and pursuing a goal the different 1008 
personality traits might be most impactful.  1009 
Limitations 1010 
In this paper, we have presented cumulative evidence from three independent studies for 1011 
the validity and usefulness of a measure for the goodness of goals and goal systems against the 1012 
framework of the theory of optimal foraging. Despite its conceptual strengths, the paper also has 1013 
some limitations. On a conceptual level, a central limitation is that our approach does not allow 1014 
to discriminate whether intergoal facilitation is due to instrumental relations among goals or due 1015 
to overlapping goal attainment strategies. Similarly, it does not allow determination of whether 1016 
intergoal conflict is due to resource constraints or due to incompatible goal attainment strategies. 1017 
The different reasons for intergoal facilitation and conflict might be differentially associated with 1018 
personality or other goal-related constructs. 1019 
 The individual studies have some conceptual limitations. In Study 1, we do not know if 1020 
people disengaged from goals because they did not fit into their goal systems (as assumed here) 1021 
or whether they disengaged from them because they already attained them. The way we asked 1022 
people to generate their goals and our data supports the first interpretation, but the second one 1023 
cannot be ruled out. In Study 2, the calculation of the resulting rate was based on one goal that 1024 
was just taken up and three goals that were probably pursued for a longer period of time. Our 1025 
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framework does not allow distinguishing between one new goal that might upset the existing 1026 
goal relations and the overall goal system. In Study 3, a large number of goals and an even larger 1027 
number of intergoal relations were assessed. Although this fact was helpful to demonstrate that 1028 
the resulting rate also seems to function well when a large number of goals is considered, it also 1029 
raises the question of whether participants might have not have filled out the questionnaire quite 1030 
as reliably when having to rate such a large number of goal relations.  1031 
Future Directions 1032 
 Applying optimal foraging theory to a system of multiple goals seems theoretically 1033 
meaningful and empirically fruitful: This paper provides evidence for the efficiency, validity, 1034 
and usefulness of the concept. Different extensions of this framework are possible: One we have 1035 
already mentioned above is the integration of resources invested in goal striving, another one is 1036 
the inclusion of a temporal perspective to better capture the dynamics of multiple goal striving 1037 
over time. Moreover, it would be interesting to consider, both theoretically and empirically, the 1038 
different stages of the action cycle that are likely to influence the relation between goals and, 1039 
thereby, the resulting rate R. Goals are dynamic and so is the goal system.  1040 
 Many goals cannot be pursued simultaneously, but need to be prioritized or pursued 1041 
sequentially (Orehek & Vazeou-Nieuwenhuis, 2013). Optimal foraging theory provides 1042 
mathematical models taking into account sequential foraging (Stephens et al., 2007) that might 1043 
turn out to be useful for understanding sequential goal striving. 1044 
 Another possible extension of the framework is its use for the prediction of goal 1045 
engagement and goal disengagement using different models of optimal foraging, namely, those 1046 
applied for animals who forage for prey and those who search for food in patches (Stephens et 1047 
al., 2007). Foraging for prey requires a “decision” of when to initiate prey action, taking into 1048 
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account resources, opportunities, success expectancies, and caloric value. This very much 1049 
resembles human motivational decisions regarding when to initiate engagement with a certain 1050 
goal. Searching for food in patches, in turn, requires a constant “monitoring of success” and a 1051 
“decision” of when to leave an exploited patch for a better one, which strongly resemble human 1052 
motivational decisions regarding when to give up no longer attainable goals and to re-engage 1053 
with more promising ones (Tomasik & Silbereisen, 2012; Wrosch et al., 2003). Optimal foraging 1054 
theory has developed different models for the two scenarios that await application in the domain 1055 
of multiple goals.  1056 
 In the present paper, we have considered the resulting rate of a goal in total without 1057 
further analyzing its single components, such as the expectancy-value component of the focal 1058 
goal, the conflict component, and the facilitation component originating from the focal goal. A 1059 
more detailed analysis of the single components contributing the overall resulting rate R will help 1060 
to identify the dimensions on which people optimize the goodness of their goal systems. People 1061 
might attempt to reduce conflicts between goals, increase facilitative relations between them, 1062 
reduce the expectancy-value of conflicting goals, increase the expectancy value of mutually 1063 
facilitative goals, or combine these strategies in different ways. A person-centered approach 1064 
using mixture models will probably be most useful to identify the different optimization 1065 
strategies and to discern how they work and when they occur.  1066 
 Finally, we anticipate new research grounds in the development and application of 1067 
methods that can capture the single components of the resulting rate on a more implicit level of 1068 
analysis. The successful application of optimal foraging theory not only in etiology, but also in 1069 
the cognitive sciences or in research on personality, suggests that a conscious representation of 1070 
the different parameters required in order to calculate the resulting rate is not essential. In 1071 
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addition to the explicit measures used in the current studies, it would be interesting to include 1072 
implicit measures of goal values and expectancies.  1073 
 In conclusion, in this paper, we have applied mathematical models successfully used in 1074 
ethology to the emerging field of multiple goal strivings in motivational psychology. In doing so, 1075 
we have implicitly considered humans as finivores (lat. finis meaning “goal” and vorare meaning 1076 
“to devour”) or organisms that strive for goals and that derive their energy from goal-related 1077 
consumptive behavior. If this metaphor is accurate, chances are good that optimal foraging 1078 
theory will provide us with new inspiration and models for our research on human motivation 1079 
and volition in the future.    1080 
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Footnotes 
1 Results based on data of Study 1 were published by Freund, Knecht, and Wiese (2014) and 
Knecht, Wiese, and Freund (2016). Freund et al. (2014) used measures of goal conflict and goal 
facilitation to predict psychosomatic symptoms assessed via self-report. They find that goal 
conflict is associated with more psychosomatic symptoms. No longitudinal data was used. 
Knecht et al. (2016) used measures of goal conflict and goal facilitation related to the leisure 
domain to predict subjective well-being over time. They find that goal conflict and goal 
facilitation is concurrently but not longitudinally related to subjective well-being. Standard 
mean composite scales of goal conflict and goal facilitation were used in both papers. Data of 
Study 2 were used by Riediger and Freund (2004), Riediger, Freund, and Baltes (2005) as well 
as Freund, Hennecke, and Riediger (2010). Riediger and Freund (2004) used measures of goal 
conflict and goal facilitation to predict subjective well-being and objective exercising. The 
authors find that goal conflict is associated with impairments of subjective well-being whereas 
goal facilitation predicts higher exercise adherence. Riediger et al. (2005) investigated age 
differences in goal conflict and goal facilitation and how these differences explain differences 
in goal pursuit. They find that older as compared to younger adults report both more goal 
facilitation and more goal engagement and that older adults higher engagement is partly 
mediated by higher levels of facilitation. In the latter two papers, goal conflict and goal 
facilitation were operationalized by standard mean composite scales. Freund et al. (2010) 
computed age differences in goal focus and investigated the association of goal focus with 
subjective goal evaluations, positive and negative affect, and goal achievement. They find that 
older adults report to have a stronger process focus as compared to younger adults and that for 
both age groups process focus predicts subjective goal evaluation, positive and negative affect, 
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and goal achievement. Data of Study 3 was used in a publication by Moberly and Dickinson 
(2016) who studied whether reasons of goal pursuit (i.e., intrinsic, identified, introjected, and 
external motivation) are associated with goal rumination. Perceived goal progress and 
importance were used as covariates but otherwise no variables analyzed in this paper were 
considered by the authors. 
2 In the few cases in which we had to remove single goals, we computed the resulting rate R 
based on the available goals and rescaled this variable as if it would represent six goals. 
3 The work was funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC). 
4 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for directing our attention to this possibility.
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Table 1. Results of latent cross-lagged panel models. 
 β  
 
Goal-related construct G 
Auto-
regression 
R 
Auto-
regression 
G 
Rt 
predicting 
Gt+1 
Gt 
predicting 
Rt+1 
Model fit 
Perceived goal progress .69/.76     
(.04/.04) 
.46/.51     
(.09/.10) 
.22/.26     
(.07/.08) 
.05/.05     
(.05/.05) 
χ2(120) = 286.56, 
p < .01; RMSEA 
= .070; CFI = .93 
Satisfaction with goal 
progress 
.69/.76     
(.04/.04) 
.60/.68     
(.08/.08) 
.12/.14 
(.06/.07) 
.05/.05     
(.05/.05) 
χ2(120) = 276.13, 
p < .01; RMSEA 
= .069; CFI = .94 
Perceived proximity of 
goal attainment 
.69/.76     
(.04/.04) 
.68/.63     
(.10/.08) 
.17/.16     
(.07/.06) 
.05/.05     
(.05/.06) 
χ2(120) = 282.59, 
p < .01; RMSEA 
= .070; CFI = .94 
Prospective engagement .50/.56     
(.08/.08) 
.47/.52     
(.15/.16) 
.25/.26     
(.12/.13) 
.29/.34     
(.08/.10) 
χ2(120) = 272.50, 
p < .01; RMSEA 
= .068; CFI = .94 
Process focus .67/.75     
(.04/.04) 
.67/.62     
(.05/.06) 
.09/.10     
(.05/.05) 
.08/.07     
(.05/.05) 
χ2(120) = 214.48, 
p < .01; RMSEA 
= .053; CFI = .97 
 Outcome focus .71/.79     
(.03/.03) 
.52/.55     
(.05/.05) 
-.01/-.01     
(.05/.05) 
-.05/-.05     
(.03/.04) 
χ2(120) = 227.37, 
p < .01; RMSEA 
= .057; CFI = .96 
Note: All coefficients are standardized; Left-hand coefficients refer to paths between T1 and T2, 
right-hand coefficients refer to paths between T2 and T3; Respective standard errors of 
coefficients printed in brackets; Coefficients printed in italics are not significant at p = .05 (two-
tailed) significance level. 
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Table 2. Summary of correlation coefficients. 
 Average Effect 
 S1/T
1 
S1/T2 S1/T3 S2/T1 S2/T2 S3/T1 S3/T2 raw weighted 
Perceived goal progress .27 .30 .37 .27 .36  .32 .31 .31 
Satisfaction with goal progress .26 .31 .32 .34 .39 .46  .35 .34 
Perceived proximity of goal attainment .32 .31 .35 .24 .35  .38 .32 .32 
Prospective engagement .47 .46 .44 .46 .41 .51  .45 .45 
Process focus .41 .32 .35   .36  .36 .36 
Outcome focus .02 .14 .04     .07 .07 
Conscientiousness .17 .07 .06 .18    .12 .10 
Openness to new experience .14 .13 .09 -.10    .07 .08 
Neuroticism -.08 -.12 -.07 -.18  -.12  -.11 -.10 
Extraversion .11 .11 .11 .03    .09 .09 
Agreeableness .11 .07 .14 .19    .13 .11 
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Satisfaction with life .02 -.04 .03 .21    .06 .04 
Moodb .12 .07 .15 .22  .20 .13 .15 .13 
Chronological age .16 .16 .17 .39  .00  .18 .16 
Sample size 269 237 233 145 145 210 194   
Note. All computations are based on Field (2001). Untransformed correlation coefficients have been used according to Hunter 
and Schmidt (1990). aFirst number indicates study, second number indicates measurement occasion; bCorrelation coefficients 
recoded for depressive mood. 
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Table 3. Correlations between goal-related and other constructs with (a) mean-composite scale M 
of goal appraisals and (b) foraging function R.  
 
 M R 
Perceived goal progress .12 
-.03 
.06 
.09 
.13 
N/A 
.17 
.27 
.30 
.37 
.27 
.36 
N/A 
.32 
Satisfaction with goal progress .01 
-.06 
.02 
-.03 
.06 
.11 
N/A 
.26 
.31 
.32 
.34 
.39 
.46 
N/A 
Perceived proximity of goal attainment .04 
.00 
.09 
.02 
.08 
N/A 
.27 
.32 
.31 
.35 
.24 
.35 
N/A 
.38 
Prospective engagement .24 
.10 
.21 
.15 
.16 
.47 
.46 
.44 
.46 
.41 
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.29 
N/A 
.51 
N/A 
Process focus .21 
.13 
.17 
N/A 
N/A 
.12 
N/A 
.41 
.32 
.35 
N/A 
N/A 
.36 
N/A 
Outcome focus -.04 
.14 
.10 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
.02 
.14 
.04 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
Conscientiousness .05 
-.01 
.09 
.09 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
.17 
.18 
.14 
.18 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
Openness to new experience .05 
.11 
.08 
-.01 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
.14 
.22 
.23 
-.10 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
Neuroticism .10 -.08 
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.07 
.08 
-.08 
N/A 
.10 
N/A 
-.14 
-.09 
-.17 
N/A 
-.12 
N/A 
Extraversion .05 
.12 
.05 
.07 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
.11 
.11 
.11 
.03 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
Agreeableness .02 
.05 
.09 
-.10 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
.11 
.09 
.11 
.19 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
Satisfaction with life -.13 
-.20 
-.11 
-.06 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
.02 
-.04 
.03 
.21 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
Moodb .17 
.23 
.12 
-.08 
.12 
.07 
.15 
.22 
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N/A 
-.18 
.-14 
N/A 
.20 
.13 
Chronological age .00 
.05 
.07 
.16 
N/A 
.00 
N/A 
.16 
.16 
.17 
.39 
N/A 
.00 
N/A 
 
Note: Study 1 (T1-T3) represented in lines 1-3; Study 2 (T1-T2) represented in lines 4-5; Study 3 
(T1-T2) represented in lines 6-7 
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Table 4. Results of latent cross-lagged panel models with the mean-composite scale M of goal 
appraisals 
 β  
 
Goal-related construct G 
Auto-
regression 
M 
Auto-
regression 
G 
Xt 
predicting 
Mt+1 
Mt 
predicting 
Xt+1 
Model fit 
Perceived goal progress .65/.65 
(.04/.04) 
.55/.55 
(.08/.08) 
.01/.01 
(.02/.02) 
.14/.14 
(.08/.08) 
χ2(45) = 79.35, p 
< .001 ; RMSEA 
= .052; CFI = .95  
Satisfaction with goal 
progress 
.59/.68 
(.03/.04) 
.65/.74 
(.07/.07) 
.00/.00 
(.04/.04) 
.05/.05 
(.04/.04) 
χ2(45) = 79.66, p 
< .001 ; RMSEA 
= .053; CFI = .96 
Perceived proximity of 
goal attainment 
.58/.67 
(.03/.03) 
.73/.70 
(.08/.07) 
.06/.06 
(.05/.05) 
.10/.11 
(.04/.05) 
χ2(45) = 75.47, p 
< .001 ; RMSEA 
= .049; CFI = .96 
Prospective engagement .55/.65 
(.04/.04) 
.62/.68 
(.10/.10) 
.02/.02 
(.05/.06) 
.14/.16 
(.05/.06) 
χ2(45) = 56.68, p 
< .001 ; RMSEA 
= .031; CFI = .99 
Process focus .58/.67 
(.03/.04) 
.70/.76 
(.05/.05) 
.08/.10 
(.04/.04) 
.07/.07 
(.04/.04) 
χ2(45) = 72.49, p 
< .001 ; RMSEA 
= .047; CFI = .98 
 Outcome focus .59/.69 
(.03/.04) 
.81/.81 
(.04/.04) 
.06/.06 
(.03/.04) 
-.01/-.01 
(.04/.04) 
χ2(45) = 67.71, p 
< .001 ; RMSEA 
= .043; CFI = .98 
Note: All coefficients are standardized; Left-hand coefficients refer to paths between T1 and T2, 
right-hand coefficients refer to paths between T2 and T3; Coefficients printed in italics are not 
significant at p = .05 (two-tailed) significance level.
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Figure 1. Trajectories of the goal-specific resulting rates Ri, depending on whether the goal was 
kept (solid line) or changed during the course of the study (dotted line). 
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Figure 2. Goal-specific resulting rate Ri, depending on the goal’s position of nomination i in the 
striving matrix. 
